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Management of Large Marine
Ecosystems: Developing a New Rule of
Customary International Lawt
MARTIN H. BELSKY*
There is a scientific consensus that the most rational way to look
at activities in or affecting the ocean is to consider the effects of
such activities on the entire ecosystem. This, in turn, has led to
calls for total ecosystem management. Historically, international
law rules have hindered attempts to establish such a comprehen-
sive approach to controls over marine uses. Recent developments
in the establishment of both a treaty and the customary law of the
sea may now provide an opportunity for the emergence of new in-
ternational norms requiring total ecosystem management regimes.
INTRODUCTION
Despite their great importance to all mankind, coastal and marine ecosys-
tems face growing threats. These threats take the form of urban and indus-
trial development and destruction of highly productive coastal wetlands and
reef areas; chemical and radioactive pollutants washed from the land, dis-
charged and dumped into the ocean, or deposited from the atmosphere; un-
controlled exploitation of ocean resources; and mounting pressure on the
world's fisheries.'
This article will examine one reason for the continuing threats to
coastal and marine ecosystems - the historical legal framework for
regulating activities in the oceans. Further, it will describe how that
legal superstructure has evolved in the last twenty years to provide
t An earlier version of this article was presented in May of 1984 at a
symposium sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida; B.A., 1965, Temple Univer-
sity; J.D., 1968, Columbia University.
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increased opportunities for nation-states, through their governments
and citizens, to manage ocean ecosystems effectively and comprehen-
sively; Finally, the article concludes with suggested options for the
community of nations to attempt total ecosystem management and
to secure its establishment as a basic tenet of the customary interna-
tional law of the sea.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The international scientific community has long recognized that
the oceans consist of interrelated species, and that actions which af-
fect any part of a marine ecosystem necessarily affect that entire
system. 2 This has led to calls for total ecosystem management.3 Ef-
fective total ecosystem management requires procedures and stan-
dards for the conservation and exploitation of living marine re-
sources, for the study and protection of those resources and their
habitats, and for consideration of the whole system encompassing the
resources and habitats.4
The international law of the sea, however, does not deal with total
ecosystems. It focuses on particular activities of the citizens of par-
ticular states. Thus, until recently, international law established few
requirements for the protection and management of the ocean ecol-,
ogy. Nation-states were not compelled to establish standards for
their own nationals and their own waters. Few rules governed activi-
ties not within the explicit competence of a state; existing rules were
the result of voluntary agreements among states.5
When states did act, either individually or collectively, to establish
rules for ocean management, they dealt separately with the questions
of pollution control and resource exploitation. Domestic legislation
and multilateral agreements only addressed specific issues such as
pollution from vessels or coastal activities, 6 or fishing for certain spe-
cies in designated waters.7 Ocean management rules, whether estab-
2. See, e.g., D. Ross, INTRODUCTION TO OCEANOGRAPHY 237 (3d ed. 1982).
3. See, e.g., Gordon, Management of Living Marine Resources: Challenge of the
Future, in CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, COMPARATIVE MARINE POLICY
145, 163-64 (1981).
4. One writer has expressed a need for "international ecostandards," established
through a process accepted by the international community and made obligatory through
a variety of processes. A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 89
(1983).
5. See generally R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 5-12 (1983)
(describing the history of international law and the law of the sea from the Roman Em-
pire to present).
6. See generally Lutz, The Laws of Environmental Management: A Compara-'
tive Study, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 447 (1976) (comparing trends and strategies in environ-
mental law in the United States and other countries); Waldichuck, An International Per-
spective on Global Marine Pollution, in CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES,
IMPACT OF MARINE POLLUTION ON SOCIETY 37 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Chapman, The Theory and Practice of International Fishery Devel-
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lished by statute or treaty, did not consider the relationships of spe-
cies to and within ecosystems.8
The Problem of Jurisdiction
International law is established and enforced by nation-states, ei-
ther individually or collectively. Unlike domestic law, as established
by legislatures or the political executives of nation-states, interna-
tional rules ordinarily are not promulgated by any worldwide legisla-
ture or agency. Rather, they are established through the customs
and practices of nations, or in multilateral compacts voluntarily en-
tered into by sovereign and independent countries." Enforcement of
an international law which has been broken is ordinarily the respon-
sibility of each nation either individually, or when nations have
agreed, collectively, through multi-national institutions. 10 Because of
this reliance on cooperative action, most international prescriptions
are limited in scope. Even established minimum standards are some-
times disregarded by individual nations."
These general jurisprudential concepts govern the legal framework
for activities in the coastal and ocean waters. National sovereignty is
the primary basis for legal rules and for institutions to enforce these
rules. Generally, nation-states decide what and how activities are to
be conducted in their own territory.' 2 Countries also have the power
opment-Management, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 408, 417-440 (1970).
8. See Comment, An Environmental Assessment of Emerging Fisheries Doc-
trine, 4 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 143, 150-61 (1977).
9. That international law has been considered to be based on the voluntary ac-
tions and agreements of states, rather than on any overriding principles of "natural law"
binding on states, is reflected in article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, which describes the bases for resolution of international disputes:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
10. See J. BRIERLEY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 100-02 (6th ed. 1963).
I1. If the United States, for example, has entered into a treaty with another na-
tion, its own domestic law requires that a later enacted statute controls even if it conflicts
with treaty obligations. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
12. Until recently, domestic and international case law focused on the power of a
state over foreign vessels entering its ports. Thus, the United States Supreme Court ex-
pressed the power of a nation over activities in its own territory as follows:
It is part of the law of civilized nations that when a merchant vessel of one
country enters the port of another for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to
the law of the place to which it goes, unless by treaty or otherwise the two
countries have come to some different understanding or agreement.
to establish rules for their own nationals, both inside and outside
their territory."3 While minimal limitations on such power have been
established by custom and practice, restrictions on these sovereign
rights ordinarily must be voluntarily agreed to by the nation-state
and enforced by the nation-state alone or together with other na-
tions, pursuant to voluntary compacts or agreements. 14 Conversely,
no state has the unilateral power to apply or enforce rules, except
against their own nationals, in the territory of another nation or in
territories not considered under the jurisdiction of any nation. One
nation can establish rules for activities in another state's territory or
in international waters only by working with other nations, signing
voluntary agreements, and developing accepted custom and
practice. 15
The management of large marine ecosystems thus depends almost
entirely on the voluntary agreement of individual countries. They
must believe such management is in the best interests of their own
nation. Hence, while there are few legal impediments to the compre-
hensive management of ecosystems, neither are there many legal
incentives. 16
The possibility of comprehensive management depends on the ac-
Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 11 (1887).
13. The ability of a nation to establish rules over its own nationals includes the
power to establish rules over its own vessels. This is traditionally called "flag-state" juris-
diction or competence. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933) (jurisdiction
over people of national vessels); Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (jurisdiction
over vessels under "flags of convenience").
14. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. 27 I.L.R. 117, 211-18 (Arbi-
tration Trib. 1958) (a state has the right to control ingress and egress of products into
territorial waters but this right is limited by treaties and customary law which requires
states to keep ports open to foreign merchant vessels unless vital interests of the state are
affected).
15. See The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18-19:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a state
is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state. In this sense,
jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a state outside its
territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom
or for a convention.
16. As stated in the Global 2000 Report:
Living marine resources are globally considered as a common property to be
held and managed in perpetual trust. The scope of commonality is a variable
factor and recently has been defined in terms of extended coastal jurisdictions.
Division by national boundaries is totally artificial with respect to the resource
and, to a lesser extent, the same is true of the offshore limits. Because of differ-
ing concepts of optimality and management, national objectives may be quite
differently perceived, even for the same population. This tends to further exacer-
bate the harmony between man and nature that is essential for continued and
optimal utilization of the resource. This is critical at present with respect to the
effects of fishing and perhaps even more critical in the future with respect to
pollution and other man-made changes in the marine environment.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE GLOBAL 2000 RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT 109 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GLOBAL 2000 REPORT].
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tions of states in dealing with ecosystems in four different jurisdic-
tional situations: (1) controls over a total ecosystem that exists solely
within the territory of a single nation-state; (2) controls over an
ecosystem that crosses over the territories of two or more states; (3)
controls over an ecosystem that exists solely within international wa-
ters; and (4) controls over an ecosystem that exists in the territory of
one or more nations, and in international waters.
Nation-states are free to promulgate rules for any ecosystem to-
tally within their territory. Subject to minimal limitations found in
customary international law or in voluntary compacts with other na-
tions, they are also free not to establish ecosystem management
rules. Enforcement of even minimal limitations on one state depends
on the actions of other states. This action is presently accomplished
through political rather than legal means.' 7
When an ecosystem crosses over the territory of more than one
nation, management of the total ecosystem can occur only with the
explicit consent of each nation-state involved. Thus, each state may
decide whether or not to set rules for management within its terri-
tory and may disregard completely any standards established by its
sister states. These nations are free, however, to establish, a manage-
ment system applicable to the total ecosystem.' 8
17. The existence of a territorial sea, subject to the jurisdiction and control of the
adjacent states, with only minimal limitations on that power by customary international
law, was never a real issue. The extent or width of this jurisdiction, however, is an open
question. See MacRae, Customary International Law and the United Nations' Law of
the Sea Treaty 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 181, 207-09 (1983). See also R. CHURCHILL & A.
LOWE, supra note 5, at 200-02.
It should be noted, however, that as far as pollution control or ecosystem management
is concerned, the power of the territorial sovereign
allows no international purview over any type or degree of environmental change
that arises within the geographical borders of a sovereign state, regardless of the
extraterritorial effects of the change. It does not speak directly to the question of
pollution in areas outside of a state's exclusive legal control (the oceans, outer
space, and unclaimed land); yet within the state, it implies a very high, or infi-
nite, threshold of alteration for which international law would be unable to hold
the state responsible.
A. SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 67.
18. When the territorial sea of each nation was narrow, there were few conflicts.
Moreover, most nations did not regulate any of their own fisheries. Thus, there were few
bilateral or regional agreements. Beginning in the late 1940s, a number of fisheries com-
missions were established, without any attempt to change the basic structure of interna-
tional law or to grant jurisdiction to each adjacent state. Essentially, these commissions
were set up to regulate particular fisheries or fishing in particular regions. The scope and
power of these commissions depended entirely on the willingness of the contract states to
set controls and then enforce them. Many of these commissions dealt first with species in
shared territorial waters and then later with these species in adjacent international wa-
ters. See Chapman, supra note 7, at 417-41.
These jurisdictional constraints impede attempts to establish rules
for total ecosystem management in the territorial waters of one or
more nations. Yet they are even more troublesome in dealing with
ecosystems solely or partially within international waters. Until re-
cently, international law assumed that international waters were res
nullius; totally free and not belonging to any nation.19 Except for the
controls placed by a country on its own nationals, no rules or proce-
dures could be established to preclude or even control activities in
such waters. Nation-states were free to join together to establish
common rules binding on their own people. The citizens of other
countries who were not a party to these treaty arrangements were
not bound by such standards.20 As with practices within territorial
waters, some minimal limitations could be set by international cus-
tom and practice. Again, however, these rules existed without effec-
tive international legal enforcement. Application of any common set
of rules depended on voluntary acquiescence or the political power of
other nations, acting individually or through collective institutions.21
Because ecosystems existed within one or more nations' territory
and in international waters, jurisdictional responsibilities and limita-
tions clashed. When states did agree to establish common standards,
these restrictions applied only to the common territory and only to
the nationals of the agreeing states in international waters. Unless a
treaty or a customary rule existed which all states followed, no state
was forced to comply with those standards in dealing with parts of
the ecosystem located in international waters.22 Moreover, because of
nationalism, many states opposed establishment of international
standards which restricted their freedom to regulate activities within
their territories or in international waters.2 3
19. H. GROTIUS. THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 22 (R. Magoffin transl. 1916); I.
O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 13 (1982).
20. See de Klemm, Living Resources of the Ocean, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
OF THE SEA 71, 92 (D. Johnston ed. 1981).
21. For a discussion of the problems of enforcement of regional or international
fisheries agreements, see Goldberg, Ends & Means, The Role of Enforcement Analysis
in International Fisheries Regulation, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT 183 (G. Knight ed. 1975).
22. See de Klemm, supra note 20, at 92.
23. Fish has always been a major food source. Therefore, nations had a national
economic motive to limit interference in attempts to harvest such resources. As explained
by one writer:
It is equally obvious that this strong and almost universal striving to develop
the ocean fisheries will cause great strife among the nations. Conflict over ocean
fisheries has been the cause of war among sovereigns for almost all of modern
history; major conflicts just short of war have occurred in our generation; and
there is scarcely a week goes by that armed force is not used, or threatened to
be used, in fishery conflicts somewhere in the world. It can be confidently ex-
pected that these problems will increase in intensity, number, and variety before
they become less.
Chapman, Fishery Resources in Offshore Waters, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFSHORE
[VOL 22: 733. 1985] Management of Marine Ecosystems
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Thus, differing jurisdictional responsibilities for ecosystem man-
agement could and did constrain comprehensive responses to ocean
management issues.2 4 Each of these jurisdictional possibilities, how-
ever, provide opportunities as well as constraints. The larger the ter-
rtorial area within the jurisdiction of a nation, the more scope exists
for a sensitive national political leadership to develop comprehensive
management programs. 25 The greater the consensus there is by the
international community regarding the need for comprehensive man-
agement, the more likely it is that bilateral or multilateral standards
can be adopted and implemented to assure total ecosystem manage-
ment. 26 National governments, however, have not focused on ecosys-
tem management and no rule of international law forces them to
take a broad look at the numerous problems that face marine ecosys-
tems.2 7 Instead, both state practice and multi-state agreements have
taken a narrower view of ocean management, and limits on pollution
and management of living resources historically have been addressed
separately.
BOUNDARIES AND ZONES, 87, 93 (L. Alexander, ed. 1967).
24. The head of the National Marine Fisheries Service of the United States de-
scribed the problem as follows:
Until recently the U.S. Government - like many other national governments
had limited or no authority over living marine resources beyond the territorial
limits, except under legislation implementing U.S. participation in international
fishery agreements. Although there are exceptions, most international conserva-
tion efforts can best be described as creating regimes that prevented more seri-
ous resource declines than otherwise would have occurred. International agree-
ments did not create a single management entity charged with the responsibility
to make tough decisions nor - more importantly - to implement and enforce
these decisions. As a result, the various international fisheries commissions were:
(1) unable to ensure optimum harvesting of the resources; (2) ineffective in con-
trolling or allocating catch and effort; (3) incapable of resolving major issues
among competing groups of foreign nations; (4) unable to make timely manage-
ment decisions required to achieve conservation; and (6) [sic] not constituted to
deal with major social and economic considerations.
Gordon, supra note 3, at 145 (footnote omitted).
25. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE,
FISHERIES FOR THE FUTURE 10-11 (1982) (United States 200-mile Fishery Conservation
and Management Act means to conserve as well as exploit fishery potential).
26. See Goldie, International Maritime Environmental Law Today - An Ap-
praisal, in WHO PROTECTS THE OCEAN? 63, 121 (J. Hargrove ed. 1975).
27. For a discussion of the inherent problem of international resources manage-
ment and a consideration of the long-term benefits to be obtained from applying an
ecosystem approach as against the short-term returns obtained by maximum fisheries
utilization, see Comment, supra note 8, at 143-46.
Controls on Pollution and Fishing
As a result of increased environmental sensitivity during the last
fifteen years,28 an increasing number of nations are adopting strin-
gent laws and regulations to control pollution of the coastal and
ocean waters adjacent to their coasts. 29 Such rules include limits on
dumping of wastes, and the reduction of land-based discharges into
the oceans.30 Countries also have established rules to control the ac-
tivities of their nationals in territorial waters or high seas. These in-
clude set design standards for vessels under a nation's flag and limits
on oil or chemical discharges from those vessels.31 Finally, some
states have established rules governing vessels entering their ports.
These rules are intended to assure the safety of such vessels and re-
duce the potential for pollution by the vessels when in the waters of
another state or in the high seas. 32
Additionally, transnational pollution is being addressed by the in-
ternational community. As early as the 1950s, nation-states joined
together in voluntary bilateral and multilateral agreements to set
minimum standards. These actions began to limit the adverse envi-
ronmental effects of man's activities.3 These agreements, however,
28. See Kay & Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION 1-3 (D. Kay & H. Jacobson eds. 1983); R. BROWN, R. OUELLETrE & P. CHER-
OMISINOFF, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND RESEARCH PROGRAMS: A COM-
PARISON AMONG SELECTED PROGRAMS 1-8, 15-17 (1983); Johnston, The Environmental
Law of the Sea: Historical Development, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA 17,
39-40 (D. Johnson ed. 1981).
29. See, e.g., Bender, Marine Environmental Protection in the Scandinavian
Countries, in COMPARATIVE MARINE POLICY, supra note 3, at 179; Chasis, Marine Envi-
ronmental Protection in the United States, in COMPARATIVE MARINE POLICY, supra note
3, at 187.
30. See Whipple, Land-Based Source of Marine Pollution and National Con-
trols, in THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES 29 (J. Charney ed.
1982) [hereinafter cited as NEW NATIONALISM].
31. See Schneider, Prevention of Pollution from Vessels or Don't Give Up the
Ship, in NEw NATIONALISM, supra note 30, at 13-14. See, e.g., Wallace & Ratcliffe,
Water Pollution Laws: Can They be Cleaned Up?, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1344, 1344-55
(1983).
32. See, e.g., Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-36
(1982).
33. Although there had been pollution treaties in the 1950s, see, e.g., Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12
U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, the real movement towards multilat-
eral consideration of environmental issues began in the 1950s. The Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (retitled in 1982 the International Maritime Organ-
ization), which is a specialized agency of the United Nations, became revitalized. It de-
veloped international standards and agreements for maritime safety and the control of
vessel-based pollution. See Johnston, supra note 28, at 40; Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra
note 31, at 155; Goldie, supra note 26, at 91. In 1972, The United Nations convened a
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden. This meeting was at-
tended by representatives of most UN members, of various UN and other international
and regional bodies, and observers from non-governmental organizations. The Conference
adopted a Declaration for the preservation and enhancement of the human environment
740
[VOL. 22: 733. 1985] Management of Marine Ecosystems
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
focused on particular subjects. Separate treaties provided for the
controlled cleanup of and liability for tanker oil spills,34 for limita-
tions on the dumping of matter into the oceans,35 and for the mini-
mization of pollution in connection with exploitation of seabed re-
sources.3 6 Moreover, these agreements were the result of political
compromises and were often minimal or general in scope. Even envi-
ronmentally sensitive nations were concerned about their national
sovereignty and the international legal and political implications of
setting stringent international standards controlling the activities in a
the territory of a nation or over the citizens of it.37 They were even
more reluctant to establish any international enforcement machinery
for these standards.38
More recently, nations have joined together to develop standards
to control pollution for particular geographic regions where jurisdic-
tions overlap, such as in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the
and made over 100 recommendations for governmental action at the international level.
Many of these provisions dealt with the control of marine pollution and the protection of
marine species and their habitat. See Report of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1, U.N. Pub. E. 73, II.A.14.
For a discussion of the parts of those principles and the plan focusing on the oceans, see
Goldie, supra note 26, at 102-14.
The Stockholm Conference led to the creation of an institutional structure, the United
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) as a catalyst and coordinator of international
efforts to protect the environment, including the marine environment and the species in-
habiting the oceans. See Kay & Jacobson, supra note 28, at 11; R. BROWN, R. OUEL-
LETrE & P. CHEROMISINOFF, supra note 28, at 135-41.
For a table listing all of the agreements on the prevention of marine pollution, see
Waldichuck, supra note 6, at 46-48.
34. See, e.g., International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(Marpol), 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973). Treaties were also signed that provided liability for
pollution incidents. See, e.g., The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pol-
lution Damage (The Liability Convention), 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970); The International Con-
vention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage (The Fund Convention), 11 I.L.M. 284 (1971).
35. See, e.g., The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter (The London Dumping Convention), Dec. 29, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 2403 T.I.A.S. No. 8165.
36. The 1958 Conventions on the Continental Shelf, art. 5(7), Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471 T.I.A.S. No. 5578, and on the High Seas, art. 24, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2512 T.I.A.S. No. 5200, provide general requirements for nation states to avoid both
accidental and deliberate seabed pollution.
37. See A. SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 19-21, 32. For example, the 1976 Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from the Exploration and
Exploitation of Sea-bed Mineral Resources did not come into force immediately as
"many a state [was] reluctant to impose too severe a burden on its offshore operators."
Remond-Gouilloud, Pollution from Seabed Activities, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF
THE SEA, supra note 20, at 245, 255.
38. See Friedheim, Ocean Ecology and the World Political System, in WHO
PROTECTS THE OCEAN?, supra note 26, at 154-55.
North Seas. Such "regional seas" programs and controls are more
comprehensive in dealing with all types of pollution and more strin-
gent in setting standards and establishing procedures to enforce
them."
Nation-states are also acting to control overexploitation of living
marine resources. Many states have established fisheries manage-
ment procedures for fishing in their waters, 40 and have joined to-
gether with adjacent states in agreements to govern fishing in waters
which cross jurisdictional boundaries. 41 Generally, however, agree-
ments like those concerning pollution deal with specific, narrow
problems. They focus on particular species or regions, or on the pro-
tection of unique and sensitive endangered species or marine mam-
mals.42 These agreements do not look to the whole ecosystem, or to
the relationship between species.43 Moreover, when they do address
geographic areas, the agreements usually focus on economic and po-
litical issues, such as dividing the resources, rather than on ecologi-
cal issues, such as conservation of the resources.4
39. See Keckes, Regional Seas: An Emerging Marine Policy Approach, in COM-
PARATIVE MARINE POLICY, supra note 3, at 17-20; de Klemm, supra note 20, at 156-58;
Johnston & Enomoto, Regional Approaches to the Protection of the Marine Environ-
ment, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 20, at 285. See also, Boxer,
The Mediterranean Sea: Preparing and Implementing a Regional Action Plan, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 28, at 167.
40. See, e.g., Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 90
Stat. 331, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1802 (1982). See also Gordon, supra note 3, at
146-53.
41. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 5, at 203-05.
42. For a discussion of the proposed Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty with
Canada, see Wilkinson & Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation
and Allocation of a Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 KAN. L. REV. 17,
56 (1983). For a discussion of international agreements on the protection of marine
mammals and marine endangered species, see Travalio & Clement, International Protec-
tion of Marine Mammals, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 199 (1979).
43. In 1974 the American Society of International Law established a Working
Group on Living Marine Resources to provide "principles for a Global Fishery Manage-
ment Regime." The principles proposed a global treaty to assign responsibility for fishery
management. It is indicative of the philosophical attitude of international lawyers that
the proposal was for a species specific, geographically determined management program.
No discussion was made of the ecosystem approach. See generally AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY, PRINCIPLES FOR A
GLOBAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT REGIME (1974), reprinted in THE FUTURE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, at 213-37.
A statement by a representative of the Fisheries Division of the European Economic
Community illustrates the problem: "Our fisheries management policy in the Community
is essentially one of response to a particular situation, rather than a policy which has
been founded on a set of guiding principles. It began as a reaction to event. .. ." Far-
nell, EEC Fisheries Management Policy, in COMPARATIVE MARINE POLICY, supra note
3, at 137, 139.
44. For a discussion of one "case study" of the effects of politics and economics
controlling international agreements as to fisheries, see Larson, Case Study: United
States Tuna Policy, in CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, THE UNITED
STATES WITHOUT THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY: OPPORTUNITY AND COSTS 213 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as THE U.S. WITHOUT THE TREATY].
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THE EVOLVING LAW OF THE SEA
Pollution and living resource management issues have not been
comprehensively addressed by law. Nation-states have their own
rules, and multilateral agreements focus on particular issues or spe-
cies. Political leaders have paid little attention to total ecosystem
management, hence few laws have been established to provide for
such management.,5 Still, international law does not preclude such
management. Moreover, there is some evidence that two recent de-
velopments in international law can lead to future rules providing for
ecosystem management.
First, the establishment of extensive fisheries zones, extending ter-
ritorial responsibility as far out as 200 miles from a country's coast,
provides the opportunity for states to individually manage larger eco-
systems. This could force states to re-evaluate their fisheries man-
agement policies. Second, the international community is beginning
to accept responsibility for preserving the resources and ecology of
both territorial and international waters.46 This acceptance may be
merging into customary rules of international law which promote
consideration of total ecosystems and the establishment of standards
for those systems. 47
45. For a discussion of the problems inherent in this ad hoc approach to ocean
management, see Belsky, A Strategy to Avoid Conflicts, 27 OCEANUS, Winter, 1984/85
at 19. For an example of an ecosystem "model" that could be used by political leaders to
develop comprehensive management regimes, see T. LAEVASTU & H. LARKINS, MARINE
FISHERIES EcOsYsTEM (1981).
46. See generally A. SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 130-52 (discussing "evolving
regimes of state responsibility" for injury caused by a state's pollution). Some publicists
believe that a nation's liability for injury caused by pollution of its waters or by its na-
tionals can be based on failure to prevent environmental damage as well as the damage
itself. See, e.g., Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 44 (Judge Alvarez, concurring opinion)
(responsibility of state to know of activities in its port and stop improper activities); Trail
Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941) (responsibility for
transboundary pollution). This "new state responsibility" as to pollution control and eco-
logical protection is particularly appropriate for application to the marine ecosystem.
Compare Goldie, supra note 26, at 120-21 with Hargrove, Environment and the Third
Conference of Law of the Sea, in WHO PROTECTS THE OCEAN?, supra note 26, at 191,
208 (expressing the hope in 1975 that "the law of the sea treaty may well enunciate a
general principle of state responsibility and liability for injury to the marine
environment .. ").
47. At a certain point, a series of state practices, codified in treaties or working
agreements, and supported by the writings of legal scholars and the acknowledgement or
acceptance of the world community, passes from mere examples of national action to a
customary norm of international law. A total ecosystem approach to conservation and
management of resources could become binding customary international law via this
route. Macrae, supra note 17, at 200-04. See also Burke, Book Review, 78 AM. J. INT'L
L. 270, 271 (1984) (quoting D. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 38
Fisheries Conservation and Management Zones
Historically, the extent of the power of a nation over the ecosys-
tems and the resources in waters adjacent to its coast has focused on
the balance of the two international law doctrines described earlier
- freedom of the seas and adjacent state sovereignty. Until the mid-
dle of the twentieth century, most nations favored broad application
of open seas freedoms and narrow application of sovereign rights. A
nation-state had the right to include within its territorial dominion
only a very narrow band of neighboring coastal waters (generally a
three mile zone). In that limited area, the adjacent coastal state had
the authority, but not the responsibility, to regulate activities.
Outside that limited band, the citizens of all nations had the right to
use the oceans for any innocent purpose, defined to include naviga-
tion and fishing. Except for controls over its nationals, no nation had
the unilateral authority, let alone the responsibility, to control such
innocent activities in international waters.4
The application of these rules meant few jurisdictional conflicts; it
also meant few standards of conduct. With narrow three-mile zones
and generally accepted procedures to define these areas, there were
disputes regarding the power of states to decide what could be done
in these territorial waters. Moreover, because of the limited breadth
of sovereign rights, most countries did not establish rules for man-
agement or protection. Other activities which could pollute the wa-
ters or otherwise affect the habitat of living marine resources were
similarly unrestricted.49
The narrowness of sovereign claims meant a large ocean area with
almost no controls or restrictions. The freedom to fish, or overfish,
was an essential element of the traditional legal doctrine of freedom
of the seas and was not to be limited. 50 Furthermore, the adverse
effect on resources caused by conflicting uses of the oceans was not
considered. Marine pollution was not perceived as. a significant prob-
lem.51 Pollution caused by man's activities generally was believed to
be limited to that caused by another traditional freedom - the right
(1982)).
48. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976: First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV.
427 (1977) (describing the experience of the United States).
50, See de Klemm, supra note 20, at 92. As late as 1960, when the nation-states
convened to attempt a comprehensive codification of the law of the sea, the "freedom of
fishing" was considered part of the "traditional freedoms of the high seas." D'Amato &
Hargrove, An Overview of the Problem, in WHo PROTECTS THE OCEAN?, supra note 26,
at 26.
51. See Remond-Gouilloud, Prevention and Control of Marine Pollution, in THE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 20, at 193.
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of ships to navigate without interference in international waters.5 2
Moreover, the technology that later allowed exploitation of other
ocean resources did not yet exist.53 Finally, the adverse effect of
coastal activities on the ocean ecosystem was not well recognized.5 4
Not until 1945 did nations recognize the economic potential of the
oceans and the possibility of reserving large amounts of that poten-
tial for their own citizens. 5 Even then, the focus was on minerals
and not living marine resources. Scientists and bureaucrats told
President Truman of the United States that vast quantities of oil,
gas, and other minerals were available in the submerged lands adja-
cent to each continent, as far out as the end of the continental
shelf.58 The result was the Truman Proclamation, the first step to-
wards limiting the scope of the freedom of the seas doctrine and in-
creasing the breadth of sovereign claims over adjacent ocean terri-
tory. In that Proclamation, President Truman asserted jurisdiction
over all the mineral resources in the lands beneath the oceans, out to
the end of America's continental shelf.5 8 Although this first procla-
mation became the focus of international legal attention, the Presi-
dent issued simultaneously a second proclamation. In it, he expressed
the possibility that the United States could limit and manage fishing
off its coast by creating extended fishing conservation zones adjacent
to the American coast.5 9
The reason for the second proclamation is unclear. Concern had
been raised about the depletion of fishing resources, especially
salmon, caused by foreign fishing. 60 Some believed that a warning of
52. Tanker spills, such as those resulting from the loss of the Torrey Canyon,
were perceived to be the problem, and control of such vessel pollution required a balanc-
ing of controls with protection of navigation rights. See Schneider, Pollution by Vessels,
in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 20, at 203, 203-09.
53. Burke, Law and the New Technologies, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note
23, at 204, 218.
54. Remond-Gouilloud, Land-Based Pollution, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF
THE SEA, supra note 20, at 230, 230-31.
55. Promulgation of the Continental Shelf Proclamation in 1945, see infra note
58, is generally recognized as the beginning of the "new era" in territorial claims. See
Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect, 20 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 561, 565 (1983). See also Pardo, The Law of the Sea: Its Past and Its Future, 63
OREGON L. REV. 7, 13 (1984).
56. See Hollick, U.S. Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L
L. 23, 28 (1976).
57. See Alexander, supra note 55, at 565; D'Amato & Hargrove, supra note 50,
at 25.
58. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945), 3 C.F.R. § 67 (1945).
59. Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945), 3 C.F.R. § 68 (1945).
60. See Hollick, supra note 56, at 27-28, 33.
possible future limitations could lead to reductions in such foreign
overfishing.60 Yet the United States did not desire to immediately
create such zones. Its fishing fleet was considered one of the best in
existence, and it depended on the freedom to fish all over the globe.62
Still, the precedent was set. In the 1950s and 1960s, Latin American
countries claimed jurisdiction out to 200 miles so as to control all
fishing in their waters and attempted to exercise their claims of juris-
diction over the vigorous protests of the United States and other
maritime nations. 3 The larger maritime nations objected to such
zones as contrary to customary international law, which provided for
only a narrow territorial sea and for high seas freedoms beyond that
area. Only treaty agreements, it was urged, could provide for such a
radical change in the set balance between territorial sovereignty and
international freedom of the seas. 4
61. Id. at 25, 32, 47, 54.
62. During the 1930s, Japanese entry into the North Pacific salmon fishery and
the depletion of Bristol Bay salmon stocks to an unacceptable level troubled the United
States. Though the Japanese were first a military enemy and then a defeated ally in the
years surrounding the Truman Proclamations, the problems of the 1930s were still recal-
led by many at the time of the drafting of the Proclamations. In the Proclamations, the
United States was careful to ensure that it was not extending its sovereignty or jurisdic-
tion, but rather merely expressing a "policy" that would allow "conservative zones" mu-
tually agreed to by all involved nations. J. JACOBSON & K. DAVIS. FEDERAL FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE BOOK TO THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
ACT 3-4 (1985).
63. See A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 161-67
(1981).
64. See generally Knight, International Fisheries Management: A Background
Paper, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, supra note 21, at
10.
As a result of the first Law of the Sea Conference in 1958, four treaties were drafted:
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606 (1964), T.I.A.S. No. 5639 56 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea
Convention]; The Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471
(1964), T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as High Seas Continental
Shelf Convention]; The Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312
(1962), T.I.A.S. No. 5200 559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter cited as High Seas Conven-
tion]; and the Convention on Fishery and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138 (1966), T.I.A.S. No. 5969 [hereinafter cited as
Fisheries Convention].
Certain provisions of each Convention bear on the issue of fisheries management. The
Territorial Sea Convention failed to establish an agreed maximum breadth for the terri-
torial sea. This allowed the United States to continue to assert that only a three mile
zone existed under international law. The Fisheries Convention allowed coastal nations a
restricted right to regulate fisheries in adjacent areas of the high seas. This Convention,
however, has never been a significant tool for fisheries management because many of the
major fishing nations did not ratify it. The High Seas Convention codified the concept of
freedom of the high seas, including freedom of fishing. This was qualified only by certain
conservation measures required by the Fisheries Convention, see infra note 90, and the
duty to give reasonable regard to the interest of other states in exercising the freedoms of
the high seas. Finally, the Continental Shelf Convention included "sedentary species" of
living resources within the exclusive continental shelf jurisdiction of the coastal state. See
Schaefer, Some Recent Developments Concerning Fishing and the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371 (1970).
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Despite these protests, 5 however, the concept of an extended fish-
eries zone began to evolve through discussions in diplomatic confer-
ences in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 61 Nations increasingly
adopted or accepted such zones.6 7 Finally, in the mid-1970s, the
United States, as the leading maritime nation, established its own
200 mile fishery conservation and management zone. 8 The 1976
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act gives the United States
exclusive national sovereignty and control over all living marine re-
sources out to 200 miles. The Act does not explicitly provide for
rules and standards for ecosystems within such zones. Rather, it calls
for policies and regulations to govern and limit fishing of certain spe-
cies.69 The Act does, however, allow ecosystem management. Re-
gional councils and federal regulators are free to develop controls for
the conservation and management of groups of species and their
habitats. 0
The 1976 Act limits the scope of United States jurisdiction in only
one category of fisheries - it precludes national regulation of highly
migratory species.7 1 The United States hoped to shape evolving cus-
tomary international law relating to fisheries zones by excluding
such species from the scope of these zones. The reason for this effort
was not environmental but economic. Congress was aware of the
65. A second Law of the Sea Conference, held in 1960, attempted to limit state
jurisdiction and to establish fishing rights. It was unsuccessful, however, in resolving the
conflicts. See Knight, supra note 64, at 8.
66. See Note, American Ocean Policy Adrift: An Exclusive Economic Zone as
an Alternative to the Law of the Sea Treaty, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 492, 500-01 (1983). A
factor contributing to the acceptance of an extended fisheries zone was the International
Court of Justice decision in 1969 in the North Seas Continental Shelf Case, (W. Ger. v.
Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, and the 1974 decision in the Fishery Jurisdiction
Case, (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 33. These provided support for seaward jurisdictional
extensions by a state to control resources, including living marine resources, beyond its
traditional territorial sea.
67. For a discussion of the growth of this "ocean enclosure" movement, see gener-
ally Alexander, supra note 55.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1982). The United States had tacitly agreed to
allow a six mile territorial sea area and six mile fishery area in 1960. However, no treaty
resulted from the 1960 negotiations, see supra note 65, and the United States continued
to insist on a three mile territorial sea, with no additional fishing rights, until 1966. See
Schaefer, supra note 64, at 384. In 1966, Congress passed the "Bartlett Act," establish-
ing a fishery zone extending nine miles beyond the territorial sea and giving the United
States the power to exclude foreign fishermen in that total twelve mile area. 16 U.S.C. §
1091-94 (West Supp. 1974) (repealed 1977).
69. See Greenberg & Shapiro, Federalism in the Fishery Conservation Zone: A
New Rule for the States in an Era of Federal Regulatory Reform, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
641, 663 n.124 (1982).
70. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 163-66.
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1813 (1982).
technological superiority of the United States' tuna fishing fleet. It
wished to promote that fleet's ability to fish anywhere on the globe,
and hoped to stop other nations from restricting fishing for tuna and
other highly migratory species within their zones.72
This action by the United States confirmed the trend of accepting
200 mile fishing zones as part of international customary law. Fi-
nally, in the 1980s, the concept of 200 mile fishing zones has become
law. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention explicitly grants to each
nation the legal authority to manage and control fisheries, as part of
its sovereign power, in a 200 mile exclusive economic zone adjacent
to its coast. 73 Even those nations which do not accept the 1982 Con-
vention, such as the United States, do accept the international legal
existence of 200 mile zones for all coastal nations.74
The existence of such zones presents both constraints and opportu-
nities for total ecosystem management. With extended jurisdiction, it
is more likely that an ecosystem, or at least large parts of an ecosys-
tem, are within one country's territorial waters.7 5 Thus, an enlight-
ened state can design comprehensive management regimes to deal
with an ecosystem. Such management regimes obviously can include
restrictions on fishing, and rules and regulations to conserve and
manage fisheries. They can also include consideration of the whole
ecological mosaic and the relationship between species, as well as
controls to limit adverse environmental effects on the affected ocean
waters, including the habitat of a fishery. 6
72. See Larson, supra note 44, at 213-15.
73. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 55-75, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as the 1982 Convention].
74. On March 10, 1983, President Reagan issued a Presidential Proclamation es-
tablishing a 200 mile exclusive economic zone for the United States. The Proclamation is
based on the fact that "international law recognizes that in a zone beyond its territory
and adjacent to its territorial sea, known as the Exclusive Economic Zone, a coastal state
may assert certain sovereign rights over natural resources and related jurisdiction .. "
Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10, 605 (1983), codified at 3 C.F.R. § 5030, re-
printed in 22 I.LM. 465 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Reagan EEZ Proclamation].
There are some minor differences between the Reagan EEZ Proclamation and the
1982 Convention provisions. Yet the basic concept of the EEZ, and the responsibility and
authority given to the coastal state for environmental and fisheries control and conserva-
tion, are almost identical or at least considered identical by policy implementors. See
Malone, Who Needs the Sea Treaty?, 45 FOREIGN AFF. Spr. 1984, at 44, 59-60 (James
L. Malone is the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs and Special Representative of the President to the Law of the Sea
Conference). See infra note 106 (management of highly migratory species not included
in United States EEZ Proclamation or in United States interpretation of international
law).
75. See de Klemm, supra note 20, at 123; Burke, Exclusive Fisheries Zones and
Freedom of Navigation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 595, 596 (1983).
76. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LowE, supra note 5, at 138. In fact, one of the
bases for the first 200 mile claims made by Latin American nations was that the fisheries
off their coasts were part of a "peculiar and unique" ecosystem that required comprehen-
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The primary constraint resulting from such extended zones is the
increased possibility of jurisdictional conflicts. Two-hundred mile na-
tional claims of sovereignty will prompt more states to claim exclu-
sive authority over activities in contested areas.77 Similarly, the like-
lihood of an ecosystem crossing over territorial boundaries is
increased. Fewer systems will be exclusively in international wa-
ters.78 Yet even this constraint can lead to opportunities for total
ecosystem management. Countries will have to resolve disputes over
territorial claims which did not previously exist. The need for resolu-
tion of those disputes could lead enlightened leaders to realize the
value of considering the whole ecosystem in any bilateral or multilat-
eral agreement. Such an agreement would affect not just the con-
tested area, but all of the fisheries zones of each affected nation-
state.719
While the opportunity for ecosystem management exists, it must
be noted that it is no more than an opportunity. The expansion of
the sovereignty of nation-states over fisheries, habitats, and ecosys-
tems does not assure total ecosystem management regimes. The deci-
sion to provide for such comprehensive consideration is still a politi-
cal one.8 0 Moreover, even if such a political decision is made by
adjacent nation-states, it does not affect the resources and activities
beyond each country's exclusive economic zone. Only the interna-
tional community can set and enforce rules and standards governing
resources, habitats and ecosystems partially or totally within interna-
tional waters.8' Fortunately, however, another international legal
trend provides opportunities for encouraging enlightened nation-state
sive management. See Goldie, supra note 26, at 60-70. See also Gordon, supra note 3, at
163-64.
77. The problem of jurisdictional conflicts certainly is not limited to international
fisheries problems; it also applies to intranational problems. For example, clashes con-
tinue to occur between the United States federal government and individual state govern-
ments over fisheries management. See Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 69, at 666-82.
See also Bubier & Reiser, Preemption or Supercession or State Regulation in the Terri-
torial Sea, in MARINE LAW INSTITUTE, TERRITORIAL SEA, Apr. 1984, at 1.
78. See Alexander, supra note 55, at 580-81. One writer has expressed his con-
cern that "national governments have a pretty dismal record in protecting their environ-
mental patrimony and the extension of sovereignty to 200 miles without effective interna-
tional control is disquieting." Pearson, Environment and International Economic Policy,
in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 46, 59 (S. Rubin & T. Graham eds. 1982).
79. See De Klemm, supra note 20, at 169. See also Kildow, Political and Eco-
nomic Dimensions of Land-Based Sources in Marine Pollution, in NEW NATIONALISM,
supra note 30, at 68, 87.
80. See generally R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 5, at 209 (describing
amendments to the functions of fisheries commissions).
81. See de Klemm, supra note 20, at 169-70.
action as to ecosystems within their own waters, for promoting
multi-state cooperation for ecosystems within shared waters, and for
securing concerted international action for ecosystems which are
partially or totally within international waters.
The Oceans as Global Commons
As noted earlier, traditional international law doctrine divided the
oceans into two jurisdictional categories - those waters within the
territorial sovereignty of an adjacent coastal state and those waters
included in the open seas. No other nation or group of nations could
tell an adjacent state how to manage activities within the waters
under the sovereignty of that state. Similarly, no nation or group of
nations could limit the activities of anyone but its own nationals in
the high seas. Only voluntary agreements or generally accepted rules
established by custom and practice could limit these freedoms.82 As
a result, until the middle of the twentieth century, there were few
international standards relating to ocean use and abuse. Controls on
pollution from coastal activities or limits on actions by nationals that
might cause pollution in the marine environment were virtually non-
existent, and no state was responsible for the transnational environ-
mental effects of the actions of its citizens.83 Few bilateral and fewer
multilateral agreements dealt with the management and exploitation
of living marine resources which crossed national boundaries. Addi-
tionally, few agreements dealt with the management and exploitation
of resources in international waters.84
Finally, in the late 1950s an increasing number of nations and the
organized international community became sensitive to the unique
nature of the oceans. Nations adopted more stringent domestic
rules.8 5 International organizations, namely the United Nations,
adopted resolutions indicating an international legal obligation to
protect the environment.8 6 States signed a series of bilateral and
multilateral agreements to provide for the study of ocean ecology,7
82. See supra notes 5-26 and accompanying text.
83. Even the early International Court of Justice cases which indicated that
under customary international law a state had some responsibility for pollution - the
Corfu Channel case and the Trail Smelter arbitration were "too vague to be very effec-
tive." See supra note 44; R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 5, at 216.
84. See Johnston, supra note 28, at 24-25, 43.
85. See supra notes 29-32, 40 and accompanying text.
86. See 4 G.A. Res. 2995, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/
8730 (1972) noting that states "must not produce harmful effects" in the exploration,
exploitation and development of their national resources. See Sohn, The Stockholm Dec-
laration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 296-502 (1973); Mc-
Manus, Legal Aspects of Land-Based Sources of Pollution, in NEw NATIONALISM,
supra note 30, at 90, 92-93.
87. Marine scientific research has also become the focus of international legal
attention. Under the traditional freedom of the seas doctrine, peaceable scientific re-
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to set minimum standards to control pollution, 8 to establish a com-
mon legal framework to resolve jurisdictional disputes,89 and to im-
pose limited responsibility for fisheries protection and exploitation."
Through these state practices and multilateral agreements, inter-
national ocean law has been changing. Most scholars, and many po-
litical leaders, believe that customary international law now provides
that the oceans are the unique responsibility of the world community
and that all nation-states share the obligation to assure their contin-
search was acceptable not just in international waters but also in coastal waters. Interna-
tional law did not hinder such activity. Neither did it provide much incentive towards
international scientific cooperation. States were free to allow their nationals to work or
not work with the citizens of other states, and to share or not share their research. In
recent years, however, treaties have established more formal international legal institu-
tions for the conducting and sharing of research. Still, with few exceptions, most such
research is done, and most information collected and shared, on an ad hoc basis. Funding
could come from international institutions pursuant to some general plan, but no compre-
hensive effort has been attempted to provide for international marine research. In fact,
more recently, even scientific research has become an issue of national sovereignty. Some
states are demanding that foreign researchers submit plans for research in their coastal
waters to their government for review, modification, approval, or disapproval. See R.
CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 5, at 24-265; Burke, Scientific Research, in THE
U.S. WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra note 44, at 113-15. The 1982 Convention, supra note
73, arts. 238, 245, 246, 252, strikes a balance. Coastal states must give their consent for
any research in their waters. States, however, have "the right to conduct research and
coastal states shall in normal circumstances give their consent" to such research. See
Vallarta, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environmental and Marine Scien-
tific Research at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 46 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 153-54 (1983).
88. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
89. See Alexander, Offshore Claims of the World, in THE LAW OF THE SEA,
supra note 23, at 71, 76-78.
90. The 1958 Fisheries Convention, supra note 64, was an initial step towards
establishing some international norms for fisheries management and conservation. In the
Treaty, the special interests of the coastal state in the conservation of the living resources
of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea is recognized, as well as the rights and
interests of distant-water fishing nations. This Convention sets forth the duty of states
engaged in high seas fisheries to adopt, and cooperate with other states in adopting, nec-
essary conservation measures; provides for participation of the coastal state in conserva-
tion management of the living resources of high seas off its coast, whether or not its
nationals are actually engaged in the fishery; and provides that, in cases of necessity,
under stipulated criteria, the coastal state may adopt unilateral conservation measures.
In addition, this Convention provides a detailed procedure for the settlement of disputes
concerning the necessity and validity of conservation measures (that should not discrimi-
nate in form or in fact among fishermen of different states on the high seas), through
negotiations among the nations concerned. Failing such negotiated solution, the Conven-
tion provides for compulsory, binding arbitration.
The Convention exceeded generally recognized customary international law in that it
gave coastal states extensive power to regulate fisheries in the high seas for conservation
purposes. The Convention received few ratifications, though the United States did agree
to it. It was only a general statement of principles and not considered "binding" custom-
ary law. Schaefer, supra note 64, at 381-82.
ued survival as an international resource. 91 Nations must take appro-
priate steps to protect the ocean areas under their sovereignty 2 and
work with each other to protect ocean areas under multiple jurisdic-
tion.9 3 Finally, nations now have a duty, individually and collectively,
to safeguard those ocean areas beyond national sovereignty. The
high seas now belong to everyone.94
Under this new rule of law, the environment of the ocean is to be
protected. All nations have the obligation to control their citizens to
assure such protection, and a state can be held internationally re-
91. See, e.g., D'Amato & Hargrove, supra note 50, at 1-7 (describing the oceans
as commons). See also Statement by the President on United States Ocean Policy, ac-
companying his Proclamation establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 383 (Mar. 14, 1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 464 [hereinafter cited as
Reagan Ocean Policy Statement]:
The United States has long been a leader in developing customary and conventional
law of the sea. Its objectives have consistently been to provide a legal order that will,
among other things, facilitate peaceful, international uses of the oceans and provide for
equitable and effective management and conservation of marine resources. The United
States also recognizes that all nations have an interest in these issues.
92. See Remond-Gouilloud, supra note 51, at 210.
93. See Johnston & Enomoto, supra note 39, at 355-56.
94. For an early discussion of this concept of "oceans as commons," see D'Amato
& Hargrove, supra note 50, at 1. For a discussion of this new "transnational environ-
mental law of the sea", see Goldie, supra note 26, at 121. See also Lutz, International of
National Approaches, in COMPARATIVE MARINE POLICY, supra note 3, at 206-12.
There is a difference between this concept of oceans as commons, with the high seas
belonging to everyone, and the oceans as "common heritage of mankind," requiring in-
ternational management of all ocean resources. See Lanschan & Brennan, The Common
Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305,
319 (1983). As discussed earlier, supra note 20 and accompanying text, early customary
international law declared international waters to be res nullius. In 1967, one Interna-
tional Court of Justice judge described the changing nature of such waters: "The high
seas [are] res communis omnium ... its use is common to everybody, and this applies to
fishing." Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3, 97 (Judge de Castro, concur-
ring). In recent years, many of the world's nations have urged that international law
provide that the high seas are the "common heritage of mankind." In fact in 1970, the
General Assembly, by a vote of 104 to 0, with 16 abstentions, declared: "The sea-bed
and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . . . as
well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind." G.A. Res.
2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (emphasis
added). The abstentions came from the Western industrialized nations. The United
States and some other industrial countries oppose the primary application of the "com-
mon heritage concept" in the 1982 Convention to the regulation of deep seabed mining
and the establishment of an International Seabed Authority to manage exploitation of
those resources. See Reagan Ocean Policy Statement, supra note 91, and Malone, supra
note 74.
The United States has, however, generally agreed on the merits of a common heritage
concept "but does not accept the interpretation of the common heritage concept" that
would provide that the deep seabed minerals cannot be mined under the unilateral laws
of any nation. See Malone, supra note 74, at 45-46. The debate is not over the oceans as
commons, implying international customary law obligations to protect and manage the
resources, but over the perceived attempt to establish a "New International Economic
Order" or "global collectivism" that would provide central economic planning and bu-
reaucratic coercion. See Malone, supra note 74, at 45.
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sponsible for violations by its citizens.9 5 The United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea codifies this new international law doc-
trine in provisions dealing with pollution control, living marine
resource management, and protection of the ocean environment.9 6
These provisions are generally accepted by all nations.9 7
95. See Hargrove, supra note 46, at 221-33.
96. See MacRae, supra note 17, at 221-22. As one participant noted, the treaty
provides for a "concept of a general environmental law of the sea based on the obligation
of all states to protect and preserve the marine environment and to control all sources of
marine pollution." Pardo, The Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Preliminary Ap-
praisal, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 489, 490 (1983).
There has been considerable debate as to whether the principles contained in the non-
seabed provisions have become part of customary international law. Some argue that a
treaty is like a contract and only binding on signatory nations. See Zuletta, The Law of
the Sea After Montego Bay, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 475, 478-79 (1983).
The United States and others argue that "the Convention does not so much create
positive law in the non-seabed areas as simply incorporate existing law that will continue
to be applicable to all states, not because of the treaty, but because of the customary law
underlying the treaty." Malone, supra note 74, at 60. In any event, since customary
international law is essentially based on state practice, see supra note 47, it seems to be
increasingly accepted that:
[t]here exists an international law of the sea totally independent of the Law of
the Sea Convention. And, indeed, the first evidence for the existence of such a
body of law lies in the fact that today virtually all countries are applying rules
of international law reflected in the Treaty text even though the Treaty is not in
effect.
Malone, supra note 74, at 61. See MacRae, supra note 17, at 221-22; Comments by
William T. Burke, in THE U.S. WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra note 44, at 71, 78-80, 82-
84; Comments by Jonathan Charney, in THE U.S. WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra note 44,
at 35-40.
Finally, even if the provisions of the Treaty are not automatically accepted as custom-
ary international law, they are recognized as the best available evidence of customary
law. Comments of John Norton Moore, in THE U.S. WITHOUT THE TREATY supra note
44, at 85, 91; Comments of Michael Hardy, in THE US. WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra
note 44, at 127.
97. In his Proclamation establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone, see supra note
74, President Reagan indicated that the United States has sovereign rights for the pur-
pose of conserving and managing both living and non-living resources in its EEZ and
jurisdiction with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment
only "to the extent permitted by international law" and "in accordance with the rules of
international law." In his Ocean Policy Statement, supra note 91, the President indicated
that, except for those provisions of the Convention Treaty that deal with deep seabed
mining, the Law of the Sea Convention "generally confirms existing maritime law and
practice." In fact, as to those non-seabed provisions, the United States "will recognize
those rights and interests" in a manner "that is consistent with" the Treaty. In explain-
ing the President's policy, Assistant Secretary of State Malone stated that the United
States will comply with the non-seabed provisions of the Treaty. Malone, supra note 74,
at 59-60.
As one United States Department of State representative articulated:
I think our assessment of the treaty text is that there is really little new on
pollution that was not already crystallizing as the LOS text evolved. I think that
is something you fought long and hard to have embodied in the text; but as I
In the 1982 Convention, primary responsibility for the control of
pollution remains with the coastal states for activities within their
exclusive economic zones (EEZs), with the flag states for their ves-
sels wherever they may be, and with the port states for vessels dock-
ing on their shores.98 This responsibility, brings obligations; flag
states must adopt and enforce pollution control regulations for their
vessels which "at least have the same effect as that of generally ac-
cepted international rules and standards." 99 Port states have the re-
sponsibility of enforcing international standards for pollution control
when a vessel responsible for pollution on the high seas enters their
harbors.100 Similarly, coastal states must adopt laws and regulations
"to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment
from any source," including land-based sources, activities occurring
in their EEZs, seabed activities, and ocean dumping.' 0 The 1982
Convention expects controls to be implemented through domestic
laws, bilateral and multilateral treaties, and other cooperative ar-
rangements. 0 2 Policies are to be harmonized at the regional level,
and the goal is to establish appropriate global rules that take into
account unique regional features.' 0 3
Similar management rules are evolving regarding living marine re-
sources. As noted earlier, nation-states were free to establish, or not
to establish, management regimes for their resources. They did not
have to work with other states in developing such regimes, and there
said earlier, we recognize that as being customary international law.
Comments of Brian Hoyle, in THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT TREATY, supra note 44, at
99 (emphasis added). Mr. Hoyle also stated that "the fisheries provisions of the treaty
are entirely consistent with [United States law] and our current law, policy and practice,
if properly interpreted." Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
98. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 5, at 225-30. Some provisions of
the Convention relating to pollution are felt to be a "step back" in pollution control.
These provisions include prohibitions on a coastal state from making laws and regulations
regarding the design, construction, or manning of foreign ships entering their ports (art.
21(2)), and provisions that define innocent passage as including non-willful pollution
(art. 19(2)(h)). Only vague obligations are included in the Convention to protect against
land-based pollution (art. 207). See Schneider, supra note 31, at 16; Remond-Gouilloud,
supra note 54, at 242-43.
99. 1982 Convention, supra note 73, at arts. 211(2), 217. There is no definition of
"generally accepted international rules." Coastal states, however, must adopt and are to
enforce such laws and regulations "conforming to and giving effect to generally accepted
international rules and standards established through the competent international organi-
zation or general diplomatic conference." Id. at art. 211(5).
100. 1982 Convention, supra note 73, arts. 218-20, 223-32. Some have called the
provisions granting extensive power to port states "the most radical innovations made to
the enforcement of marine pollution standards by the Law of the Sea Convention." R.
CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 5, at 228.
101. 1982 Convention, supra note 73, at arts. 194, 207-11 (regulation), 213-16,
220 (enforcement).
102. 1982 Convention, supra note 73, at arts. 213 (land-based sources); 214 (sea-
bed activities); 216 (dumping); 217-18, 220 (vessels); 194-97 (cooperative
arrangements).
103. 1982 Convention, supra note 73, at art. 197.
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were few international standards. Recently, however, especially as
the result of expanded fisheries zones, bilateral and multilateral
agreements have been ratified for fishing.10' Most of these are spe-
cies specific, and focus on the protection of a threatened or endan-
gered species or on limits on the capture of fish by nationals of a
particular state. Occasionally, there have been bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements which are more comprehensive, but these have been
for narrowly defined areas.1 05 As with pollution standards, however,
the international community has been moving towards recognition of
a customary rule of law governing fisheries conservation and man-
agement. This is based on state practice and new acceptance of the
oceans as a commons, and is codified in the 1982 Convention Sea.108
The 1982 Convention confirms the new national jurisdiction over
an adjacent 200 mile EEZ. Within this zone, coastal states have sov-
ereignty over the exploitation of resources and responsibility for the
protection of the marine environment. The Convention imposes a re-
sponsibility on the coastal state to manage and conserve the living
resources of the zone. Coastal states must ensure that the living re-
sources in the EEZ are not endangered by overexploitation, and that
the population of harvested species is maintained or restored at max-
imum sustainable yields. 1 07 The provisions, therefore, mandate ade-
quate national laws to enforce these international responsibilities,
and require adequate scientific and statistical data be kept to deter-
104. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 96-97. See also Comments by Michael Hardy, in THE U.S.
WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra note 44, at 121-22. One continuing problem as to fisheries
management involves controls over highly migratory species, especially tuna. The 1982
Convention, supra note 73, at art. 64, provides that the coastal states and other states
whose nationals fish in a region "shall co-operate" in the management of such resources.
The United States argues that the Convention does not thereby provide authority to
coastal states over such species, and it opposes any such interpretation of jurisdiction. See
Comments by William T. Burke, in THE U.S. WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra note 44, at
75, 84. In the fact sheet accompanying the President's Proclamation establishing the
EEZ, the United States said "the U.S. neither recognizes or asserts jurisdiction over
highly migratory species of tuna. Such species are best managed by international agree-
ments with concerned nations." 22 I.L.M. 461 (1983). Moreover, although the majority
of nation-states claim jurisdiction over tuna and other highly migratory species within
the EEZs, the United States actively opposes efforts by nations to apply any control over
American fisherman harvesting such resources, compensates American fishermen for
losses due to seizures by foreign nations of American tuna vessels fishing in their EEZ,
and authorizes bans on imports from countries that conduct such seizures. See Comment,
Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea, 1981-1982, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 679,
706-08 (1983). For the effects of this policy, see Larson, Case Study: United States
Tuna Policy, in THE U.S. WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra note 44, at 213.
107. 1982 Convention, supra note 73, at art. 61.
mine maximum yield and warn of overexploitation.10 8 To support
such national laws, coastal states and states which have citizens fish-
ing in any EEZ must submit to international organizations statistical
data on fishing efforts. 109 The world community will thus be warned,
in advance, of overexploitation.
A second feature of the 1982 Convention is that it imposes respon-
sibilities on coastal states for transboundary resources. States are
commanded to cooperate, through formal or informal agreements, to
manage stocks which occur within the EEZs of two or more
states.110 Similarly, the Convention establishes international respon-
sibility for management of species which occur within one or more
EEZs and the high seas. Coastal states are to work with the home
nations of fishermen to design rules for the fishing of stock within
and without of an EEZ.111 In addition, nation-states must, through
international organizations, formulate common rules for highly mi-
gratory species, and for anadromous and catadromous 2 species that
spend at least part of their lives in an EEZ.I13 The establishment of
such rules, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, could gov-
ern the management of ninety percent of the world's fishing. 1 4
The 1982 Convention also provides general standards for fishing
management in the high seas. For such fishing, all states have the
duty to exact controls over their nationals that provide for the con-
servation of living resources in the high seas, and a duty to work
with other states to develop management measures for such spe-
cies.11 5 As with rules for EEZ management, high seas exploitation
rules must include provisions to maintain or restore harvested species
at levels that will assure maximum sustainable yields.11 6
This overview of the new rules of customary international law in-
dicates that the needed legal framework provides an opportunity for
comprehensive management. It does not mandate it. The provisions
of the 1982 Convention still focus basically on species specific man-
agement regimes, and separate rules for control of marine pollution
108. de Klemm, supra note 20, at 168.
109. 1982 Convention, supra note 73, at art. 61(5).
110. Id. at art. 63(1).
111. Id. at art. 63(2).
112. Fish that are born in fresh water, then spend most of their lives in the ocean,
and return to fresh water to spawn, are called anadromous fish. Examples include salmon
and striped bass. Fish that live in fresh water but spawn in the ocean are called catadro-
mous fish. Eels are one example. D. Ross, INTRODUCTION TO OCEANOGRAPHY 268 (3d
ed. 1982).
113. 1982 Convention, supra note 73, at arts. 64, 66, 67. For a discussion of the
problem of application of the 1982 Convention Treaty provisions to highly migratory
species, especially tuna, see supra note 106.
114. See Alexander, supra note 57, at 580.
115. 1982 Convention, supra note 73, at arts. 117-18.
116. Id. at art. 119.
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from those for conservation and management of living resources.117
This is the result of the nature of international law. Nation-states
continue to see the need to protect the economic interests of their
own citizens and to guard zealously their sovereign territorial inde-
pendence and rights. The lack of comprehensive and enforceable
controls is the result of these political realities. Controls will occur
only as those states see the mutual benefit of establishing such rules
and, thus, usually will occur only when a particular problem arises.
Accordingly, the resolution of that particular problem is the focus of
national or multinational action."1 The countries are not concerned
with management of a total ecosystem.119
OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Ideally, international law could command total ecosystem man-
agement and have institutions to enforce those commands.12 Such
legal expectations, however, are unrealistic.12' Effective total ecosys-
tem management will continue to be affected, as are all other inter-
national laws and standards, by the political realities involved in
global action. Although international law is evolving towards recog-
nition of the oceans as a commons and consideration of the total and
interrelated scope of oceans problems, it has not yet reached the
point where anything more than moral support can be found for total
ecosystem management.
The history of the law governing the sea illustrates the political
problems. First, under international law doctrine, responsibility for
the study, protection and management of living marine resources is
assigned geopolitically or not at all. Second, under international le-
117. Compare Oda, Fisheries Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 739 (1983) with Vallarta, supra note 87, at 147.
118. See Pearson, supra note 78, at 58; Kay & Jacobson, supra note 28, at 9; A.
SPRINGER, supra note 4, at 20-21. For a general discussion of this conflict between scien-
tific concerns about the need for world-wide action and laws to protect ecosystems and
the realities of the world political and legal system, see Friedheim, supra note 38, at 151.
One writer has termed this ad hoc approach "synoptic decision-making" and applies
this to the establishment of national as well as global oceans law and policy. See Hennes-
sey, Evaluating Marine Policy: Criteria for Two Models and a Comparative Study, in
COMPARATIVE MARINE POLICY, supra note 3, at 223, 225. For a discussion of this "cost-
benefit" analysis in the context of evaluating United States participation in the 1982
Convention see generally, THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra note 44, at
55-109.
119. See Pearson, supra note 78, at 59; Pardo, supra note 96, at 498.
120. See Comment, supra note 8, at 161.
121. See McDougal, International Law and the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF
THE SEA, supra note 23, at 10-11, 24.
gal practice, institutions and rules for the cultivation of ocean living
resources are usually separate from those for the protection of the
marine ecology, including the habitat of living resources. Third, legal
arrangements for the study of ecosystems and the resources that are
part of the system are seldom tied to either management or protec-
tion of resources or the ecosystem. Finally, when workable legal
agreements are established to deal with marine resource problems,
such agreements are usually species specific and fail to consider the
total marine ecosystem.
The non-deep seabed provisions of the 1982 Convention can be
used to convert moral support for an ecosystem approach to oceans
management into customary rules of international law. Further, they
can overcome the prior piecemeal and chauvinistic approach to the
law of the sea. Those provisions accepted universally as either bind-
ing treaty or as customary law122 do impose responsibilities on states
to protect the environment and manage fisheries. It can be urged
that protection of all species and their habitats, and the protection of
the marine environment in general, can only be accomplished by to-
tal ecosystem management for large marine ecosystems. 23 This next
122. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
123. A continuing controversy has existed between marine ecologists and fisheries
managers regarding a conservation and management standard for determining the
amount of fishing in a particular area. See Comment, supra note 8, at 144-46. The
choice is between allowing a yield equal to the economic demands, or a yield closer to
resource protection and reproduction concerns. See id. at 146-49; Knight, supra note 64,
at 16-18, 23-25; R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 5, at 199-200. See also Christie,
The Distribution of the Sea's Wealth in Fisheries, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note
23, at 112.
Some have criticized use of a "maximum sustainable yield concept" (MSY) to deter-
mine allowable catch, unless the term is broadly defined to include environmental factors,
including the health of the ecosystem. See de Klemm, supra note 20, at 82.
The text of the 1982 Convention does focus on "maximum sustainable yield" as the
management concept for coastal states' EEZ fisheries and also for high seas fisheries. See
supra notes 101, 110-11, 115 and accompanying text. The provisions, however, do not
limit MSY to purely economic considerations, but rather specifically include scientific
and policy factors within the definition. See de Klemm, supra note 20, at 168. Thus, the
Convention provisions, whether accepted as customary law or binding international law,
should not preclude but rather encourage states individually or collectively to take a total
ecosystem approach. In GLOBAL FUTURE, supra note 1, at 104, this is explained in
describing the ecological definition of MSY:
Sustainable Fisheries Management
Fisheries and shellfish provide an important source of protein for much of the
world's population and will continue to be needed. The increasing human popu-
lation and the increasing pollution of productive coastal waters are, in combina-
tion, intensifying the pressures on the world's remaining fishery resources,
thereby raising the likelihood of overexploitation and resource failure. Human
ability to harvest the ocean resources on a sustainable basis depends on main-
taining the diversity and stability of the whole system, even though all of the
biological production may not be converted to direct, usable value to human
beings.
In GLOBAL 2000 REPORT, supra note 16, at 111, it is stated that the sustainable yield
of fisheries can only be maintained:
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step is implied in the evolving international law governing the
oceans. 124 Heightened environmental sensitivity is an opportunity to
produce mechanisms for total ecosystem management. The key is
flexibility and experimentation, with some success. 25 While some ef-
forts can be made to move all fisheries and pollution regimes to com-
prehensive management, 126 concentration by the scientific commu-
nity on a few areas of potential success will more likely lead to
international acceptance of total ecosystem management. The energy
of those seeking comprehensive regimes should be focused at the two
ends of the spectrum - large systems primarily within one or more
EEZs and large systems with unique jurisdictional and scientific
histories.
Ecosystem Management Within EEZ's
It is estimated that thirty-eight percent of the ocean and at least
seventy-five to eighty percent of the potential world catch exists
within the collective EEZs of all nations.117 Scientists should identify
ecosystems within one or more EEZs and work with government offi-
cials in such states to help design unilateral, or more often bilateral
and multilateral fishery management regimes, that focus on total
ecosystem management. Legal support for such comprehensive ac-
tion exists. States have the authority to control all acts within their
sovereign waters and to set such controls on an ecosystem basis.
with good management of the fisheries and protection of the marine environ-
ment .... To achieve this, however, will require overcoming severe social and
economic constraints. Development will have to be carefully planned so that the
balance and equilibrium of the marine ecosystem are not radically perturbed.
There is not enough information to evaluate the real possibilities of sustained
increases in yields, to say nothing of their practicality.
124. For example, in the 1982 Convention provisions dealing with protection of the
environment, the obligations on states:
include those [measures] necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile eco-
systems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and
other forms of marine life.
1982 Convention, supra note 73, at art. 194(5) (emphasis added).
125. See Jacobson, Future Fisheries Technology and the Third Law of the Sea
Conference, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, supra note 21,
at 88-89.
126. For a discussion of the opportunity afforded by acceptance of the Convention
Provision on fishing and pollution as facilitating regional agreements, see Alexander, Re-
gional Arrangements, THE U.S. WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra note 44, at 248-50 (fisher-
ies); 251 (environmental protection and preservation). See also Comments by Brian
Hoyle, in THE U.S. WITHOUT THE TREATY, supra note 44, at 254.
127. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 5, at 126. One geographer has
estimated that "over 90 percent by volume of the world's commercial fisheries catch"
would be within this collective 200 mile belt. See Alexander, supra note 55, at 580.
Moreover, the new Law of the Sea rules urge states to act, individu-
ally and collectively, to protect the oceans and their living resources.
This can best be done through total ecosystem management."28
The political support for such action is growing but must be devel-
oped. Nation-states still need to be convinced that total ecosystem
management can work - that is, that it can satisfy local resource
needs and national and international requirements for protection of
the marine environment and its resources. Scientists and fisheries
managers must exercise their political power and convince their local
decision-makers that ecosystem management is both a sound scien-
tific concept and appropriate for selected large marine ecosystems. 29
Successful application in a few cases, in nation-state fisheries plans,
or in a few bilateral or multilateral fishing agreements, can lead to
further applications. 130
Selected EEZ application is, therefore, a real testing ground. It
can work only if government leaders, scientists and fishery managers
design and apply comprehensive approaches in a few illustrative
cases and thus change the way we think and act about the oceans -
from a species specific approach to an ecosystem approach, and from
separate fisheries and pollution regimes to a regional seas compre-
hensive perspective.' 3'
128. Two commentators, in the context of describing the President's EEZ Procla-
mation, have stressed that EEZs offer:
an opportunity for reassessing the strategy underlying our present ocean govern-
ance scheme. In contrast to existing marine laws which are largely sectoral and
single-purpose in nature and have varying geographical jurisdictions, the exclu-
sive economic zone proclamation declared U.S. jurisdiction over a single geo-
graphical area in which are included all living and nonliving marine resources
(again, with the exception of tunas).
Theoretically at least, the creation of a uniform area encompassing all resources
offers the possibility of developing a multiple-use approach to marine resources
management and of redressing some of the intersectoral coordination problems
present in the current approach.
See Cecin-Sain & Knecht, Implementing the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone: An Oppor-
tunity for Inproving Ocean Governance, MARINE POLICY AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT
CENTER, WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION, ASSESSING OCEAN GOVERNANCE:
REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE OCEAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE 12, 15 (1983).
129. The increased technological capability of many fishing nations should also
provide a favorable climate for such new institutional arrangements and modifications of
existing international legal prescriptions to provide far more sophisticated policies and
procedures for determining the level of exploitation efforts and allocating yield. See
Burke, Law and the New Technology, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 23, at 204,
218-20. This, combined with increased "environmental sensitivity" by political leaders,
and new customary or treaty law requirements, if shown to work, would increase accept-
ance by policy-makers of an ecosystem approach. See de Klemm, supra note 20, at 148-
49. See also Hargrove, supra note 46, at 220.
130. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 163-64.
131. As stated in GLOBAL FUTURE, supra note 1, at 104-05:
Both national and international programs are needed to conserve ocean resources. For
example, the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone is estimated to contain 20 percent of the
world's supply of traditionally exploited living marine resources. Other countries also
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Antarctica
While more localized efforts are attempted, the international com-
munity should also seize the opportunity to set legal precedent in the
new living resource regime for Antarctica. 132 Because of its unique
history of cooperative nation-state action and environmental protec-
tion, the management of Antarctica's resources can be an interna-
tional demonstration of the possibility and potential of total ecosys-
tem management. 133 In fact, the effort to use Antarctica as a model
for future management regimes has already begun. In the Conven-
tion for the Conservation of Antarctica Marine Living Resources,
management is based on a total ecosystem conservation standard,
rather than on harvested target species. 34 In addition, the Conven-
tion requires signatory states to conduct their affairs, and watch over
the affairs of others, so as to minimize the risks to the Antarctic
marine ecosystem.13 5 As with any treaty, there are political problems
and conflicts of national interest with international cooperation that
can hinder the success of the Antarctic regime.136 Still, if the effort
is successful, it could convince political leaders that total ecosystem
control considerable portions of the oceans' resources in their economic zones. The
United States and other countries within these proposed zones must develop and adopt
new management techniques, particularly those that take into account the target species'
complex relationships with other associated species, including marine mammals and en-
dangered species, to avoid the decline or loss of both target and other living resources.
The Draft Law of the Sea Treaty encourages comprehensive coastal nation management
of fish stocks within proposed 200-mile economic zones.
132. Id. at 115-16.
133. B. MITCHELL & R. SANDBROOK, THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SOUTHERN
OCEAN 49 (1980).
134. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done
May 7, 1980 preamble, art. 11 (3), T.I.A.S. No. 8826, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 841 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as AMLRC]. See Boczek, The Protection of the Antarctic Ecosystem:
A Study in International Environmental Law, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 347, 375-76
(1983); Frank, The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
sources, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 291, 303-05 (1983).
135. AMLRC, supra note 134, at arts. V, XXI, and XXII. See also Boczek, supra
note 134, at 379-80.
136. One problem is the possible application of the "common heritage of mankind"
concept to the Antarctic Treaty System. See Larschan & Brennan, supra note 94, at
331-33. Another problem is that the Convention only binds signatory nations. See
Boczek, supra note 134, at 388. Furthermore, the Convention does not resolve the tradi-
tional claims of the Antarctica Treaty members to segments of the continent and to the
resources in the coastal waters adjacent to those segments. See Bilder, The Present Legal
and Political Situation in Antarctica, in NEW NATIONALISM, supra note 30, at 167, 176.
Finally, the success of the AMLRC could be threatened by the push to develop the
mineral resources off the coast of Antarctica. See Zumberger, Potential Mineral Re-
source Availability and Possible Environmental Problems in Antarctica, in NEW NA-
TIONALISM, supra note 30, at 115, 120-23, 133-34, 137-44.
management can work for large marine ecosystems and that states
can satisfy and integrate domestic economic concerns into a compre-
hensive multinational approach. As such, it could be another step in
the creation of an international customary law norm requiring total
ecosystem management.13 7 It is therefore essential that environmen-
tal interest groups, scientists and fisheries managers desiring interna-
tional legal adoption of a total ecosystem approach support the
Antarctic regime and work together to make it successful.'s3
CONCLUSION
With the new enlightened international political sensitivity to total
ecosystem management, there is the potential for establishing new
international standards providing for application of the comprehen-
sive approach to govern man's activities in the oceans. Such new in-
ternational law will not result from the establishment of legislative-
type worldwide rules. The nature of international law precludes such
international mandates. Nation-states will continue to protect their
own sovereign interests; international law supports this concept of
national power. States will oppose new legal norms that diminish this
power and will therefore agree to cooperative efforts only when they
are convinced that such efforts benefit them.
The nature of international law, however, does provide the oppor-
137. Thus, it would be in each nation's own interest to support a total ecosystem
approach.
Governments exist - or believe they exist - to protect national interests. They
recognize, in a theoretical way, the need for solutions which promote the wider
interest of all mankind. But they assume that such solutions can only be the end
product of a fight: of bitter and protracted wrangling among many different
representatives, each bargaining for their own nation, rather than from a com-
mon, disinterested effort among all to devise the system that would best serve
the interest and promote the welfare of the world as a whole. They accept the
need for mutually acceptable arrangements. But their first aim is to ensure that
the arrangements are acceptable to themselves. This is the inevitable effect of a
situation in which political power and political parties are still organized on a
national rather than an international basis.
E. LAURD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEABED 197 (1984), quoted in Barnes, The Emerging
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: An Attempt to
Meet the New Reality of Resource Exploitation in the Southern Ocean, in NEw NA-
TIONALISM, supra note 30, at 239, 274 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
138. Some ecologists and environmental organizations criticize AMLRC but not
because of its ecosystem approach. Rather they are concerned about the possibility of
future mineral exploitation, and the inability of Antarctic Treaty nations to enforce stan-
dards and the conflicts between those nations who consider the Antarctic as shared prop-
erty with those who consider it international property. They have therefore proposed a
"World Park," Trusteeship," or "Sanctuary" status for Antarctica. See, e.g., J. BARNES,
LET'S SAVE ANTARCTICA 30-31, 64 (1982); B. MITCHELL & R. SANDBROOK, supra note
133, at 4. It is important that those seeking additional protections for the Antarctic and
its waters do not let such desires interfere with support for proper scientific application
and political acceptance of a total ecosystem approach to Antarctic living marine
resources.
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tunity for the emergence of new customary rules, based on state and
multi-state practice and international acceptance. The more individ-
ual states apply total ecosystem approaches both to their own man-
agement regimes and to those regimes they jointly control with other
states, the more total ecosystem management will become the pre-
ferred, and therefore customary, rule of law. This trend can be con-
firmed by a few international efforts to design guidelines and to ap-
ply those guidelines in a total ecosystem approach in particular
unique situations, such as in Antarctica marine waters.
Any constraints on total ecosystem management are not legal, but
rather political. The legal options for such an approach are virtually
limitless. The opportunities for application and acceptance of such
comprehensive responses to man's actions in the oceans must be nur-
tured carefully so as to allow a new rule of law favoring total ecosys-
tem management of large marine ecosystems.

